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Hetty Blades
Coventry University
It is often claimed that dance is a particularly ephemeral medium,
more so than its neighbouring forms of music and theatre. For ex-
ample, Marcia Siegel makes the oft-cited suggestion that “dance exists
at a perpetual vanishing point.”ሾ The claim for ephemerality is based
upon dance’s seemingly loose relationship to scores and other physi-
cal objects involved in production. Whilst theatre is traditionally cre-
ated through writing a script, and music composed on paper, dance
is not seen to share this feature. Choreography occurs in numerous
ways, and dance does not operate under a codiƧƬed notational system.
This means that dance works are widely considered to physically ex-
ist only in performance.ሿ However, recent discourse and practice has
revealed many ways that dance is created and preserved through tan-
gible written or notated objects. Whilst the traditional view suggests
that scores do not provide access to the work,ቀ I question this claim
by examining the centrality of the score in the making and re-staging
of Allan Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6 Parts (1959), and by assessing the
relationship between digital score and performance work in the case
of William Forsythe’s website Synchronous Objects for One Flat Thing,
reproduced (2009). Further, I will examine each example in relation
to GrahamMcFee’s ‘Thesis of Notationality,’ቁ in order to understand in
ሾSiegel 1972.
ሿCarr 1987; McFee 1992; McFee 2011.
ቀGoodman 1968; Carr 1987; McFee 1992; McFee 2011.
ቁMcFee 1992, p. 99.
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more depth the role that notational forms play in current dance prac-
tice, to show that dance works are more than abstract structures of
bodily movement, and that they may include notational objects as an
integral aspect.
1 Notation and scores, works and performances: the tra-
ditional view
In Languages of Art, Nelson Goodman provides a detailed account of
the role and function of artistic scores, as well as stringent require-
ments for notational systems. Goodman claims that in the case of
performing arts such as music, a score is a tool for the performance
of a work, and is “no more intrinsic to the work than the sculptor’s
hammer or the painter’s easel.”ቂ However, he claims that scores have
an important theoretical role, as they can be used to identify a work
from performance to performance.ቃ Goodman views the relationship
between score and performance as crucial for work-identity, going as
far as to suggest that performances must fully comply with their rela-
tive scores, and that even one wrong note results in the performance
failing to be an instance of the work.ቄ This is theoretically possible,
as Goodman does not suggest a score should notate all of the fea-
tures that must be present in a performance, but rather that the score
records the essential features.
Goodman claims that, “the language in which a score is written
must be notational”, ቅ by which he means that it must meet his ƧƬve se-
mantic and syntactic requirements. According to Goodman, scores,
and therefore notation, diƦfer from a “drawing, study or sketch on the
one hand and from a verbal description, scenario or script on the
other.”ቆ On Goodman’s view, notation uses inscribed characters to de-
note components, with each inscription standing for only one char-
acter, hence avoiding the ambiguity associated with words, drawings,
ቂGoodman 1968, p. 127.
ቃIbid., p. 127.
ቄIbid., p. 129.
ቅIbid., p. 178.
ቆIbid., p. 127.
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or even descriptions, which have the potential formultiple interpreta-
tions. It is evident that the notational requirements suit musical prac-
tice, yet in the case of dance there are only a few systems that meet
Goodman’s criteria. He points out that the method of Labanotation
passes the theoretical test for notation, as it allows for the essential
features of a dance work to be recorded.ሾሽ
Labanotation notates movement and is not speciƧƬc to dance. It
operates similarly tomusic notation, using symbols on a vertical stave
to denote body parts as opposed to notes. It oƦfers a highly detailed
description of the movement of the body. Labanotation scores record
the work as a structure of movement, rather than describing con-
cepts or scenography, for example. In Understanding Dance, McFee
stresses the potential that Labanotation holds for dance, believing it
has a helpful role in identifying and preserving works.ሾሾ Although not
used extensively at the time inwhich hewaswriting,McFee envisaged
an increase in the practice of notation.ሾሿ Dance works are particularly
ƥƷuid entities; revisions, re-stagings and re-workings are commonprac-
tice, resulting in multiple versions of works, and subsequent work-
identity questions. Furthermore, danceworks are diƦƧƬcult to preserve.
Although recording has aided preservation: a recorded performance
depicts only one version of the work, hiding the essential feature of
variability from sight. Labanotation seems to be a logical solution to
these issues. However, for economic and practical reasons, use of La-
banotation has not increased since 1992, and no single system has be-
come universal. However, this does not mean that dance works are
non-notational. It means, rather, that notation takes numerous forms.
McFee proposes a ‘Thesis of Notationality,’ suggesting that:
Performance A and performance B were performances of
the same work of art (in any performing art) just in that
case where both satisƧƬed or instantiated some particular
‘text’ in a notation agreed by the knowledgeable in the art
ሾሽIbid., p. 127.
ሾሾMcFee 1992, p. 99.
ሾሿMcFee 2011, p. 71.
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form to be an adequate notation for that form.ሾቀ
He further develops this thesis inThePhilosophicalAesthetics ofDance,
reiterating his claim that notation can oƦfer a way of resolving work-
identity questions for dance, despite Labanotationnot having become
commonplace indancepractice.ሾቁ It is important tonote that although
McFee’s thesis does not require a speciƧƬc form, likeGoodman, he does
require a notational language—as opposed to a written account.
Dance scores are created before, during, or after the work,
McFee explains, and therefore are intended as either records or
‘recipes’—although scores created as records can also be used as a
recipe to re-instance the work.ሾቂ Whilst it is theoretically possible to
compose a dance by writing a Labanotation score, this is unusual; the
score is usually created alongside or after the work, by a trained pro-
fessional—usually someone other than the choreographer. Therefore
a degree of interpretation is involved, and the score generally records
thework, as opposed to being a direct outcomeof the creative process.
This gives a Labanotation score a diƦferent status to amusical score or
the script of a play, both of which are traditionally instructions for the
ƧƬrst performance.
Following Goodman, McFee believes that, regardless of the way
in which the score is created, it does not provide access to the work.ሾቃ
This is what I refer to as the ‘traditional view,’ that is, that a dancework
is an abstract object only accessible through performance. This is a
view shared byDavid Carr, who suggests in ‘Thought andAction in the
Art of Dance,’ that whilst we can experience features of a play through
reading the script, “Choreography just is the making of dances (not
the mere ‘writing’ of them).”ሾቄ Following the model whereby a score is
used to record an existing dance, this claim seems logical, however
Carr’s suggestion does not allow for the many ways in which choreog-
raphy can occur, which may include writing. Choreography is often
ሾቀMcFee 1992, p. 97-98.
ሾቁMcFee 2011.
ሾቂIbid.
ሾቃGoodman 1968, p. 127; McFee 1992, p. 88.
ሾቄCarr 1987, p. 352.
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created on the page, albeit not through codiƧƬed notational methods.
In fact, the word ‘choreography’ derives from the Greek words ‘khor-
eia,’ meaning ‘dance,’ and ‘graphein,’ meaning ‘to write.’ Dance has a
long tradition of being planned, composed, and written prior to being
embodied, and this practice goes as far back as the seventeenth cen-
tury, when some of the ƧƬrst ballets were choreographed at a desk.ሾቅ
The planning, sketching, and writing of dance often takes linguis-
tic or idiosyncratic forms. These methods are often seen in current
dance research and practice. In the UK, over the past decade, chore-
ographic processes have increasingly been shared in various contexts
and forms.ሾቆ In the introduction to a recent issue of The International
Journal of Performance Art and Digital Media, Johannes Birringer sug-
gests that “we live in a changing world of dance, and the level of dis-
course regarding dance and choreographic practice has been raised
considerably compared to the mid or late 20th century.”ሿሽ There are
many possible reasons for this rise, including the development of
practice-as-research, which involves artistic practice as a method of
academic enquiry, and subsequently acknowledges choreography as
an epistemologically valuable activity. One of the outcomes of this
is that we are now privy to many of the notes, sketches, diagrams, and
lists that are the products of choreography. As a choreographical term,
‘score’ has become so broad that Birringer suggests that “there is al-
ways a score, in all artistic practices and in all contexts where art is
exhibited/performed.”ሿሾHere Birringer is referring to a score as a set of
structures that determines how an artwork is performed or displayed.
This is in direct contradiction to Goodman, who claims that perma-
nent physical objects, such as paintings do not require scores.ሿሿ The
vast expansion of the concept of the score results in its referring to ob-
jects that do not inherit the ontological clarity of Labanotation. Devel-
oped with varied intentions, the status and function of these scores is
ሾቅLaurenti 1994, p. 86.
ሾቆSee Anne Teresa de Keersmaeker and Bojana Cvejić’s A Choreographer’s Score (2012) and William
Forsythe’sMotion Bank (2010-2014) .
ሿሽBirringer 2013, p. 8.
ሿሾIbid., p. 10.
ሿሿGoodman 1968, p. 127.
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harder to deƧƬne and their relationship to the work diƦƧƬcult to estab-
lish.
2 18 Happenings in 6 Parts
I want to give two examples of recent scoring practices, both of which
reveal the nature of dance notation and shed light on the traditional
view of dance works. The ƧƬrst is Alan Kaprow’s 18 Happenings in 6
Parts. Kaprow developed the work by writing a detailed score, con-
sisting of diagrams, sketches, and lists of instructions.ሿቀ 18 Happenings
was not initially created to be a dance; it was a performative event that
took place on 4thOctober 1959 at the RuebenGallery in NewYork. JeƦf
Kelley describes coloured lights, recorded sounds, odours, speech, and
routine-like actions.ሿቁ
The event did not ƧƬt neatly into any existing category of perform-
ing or visual arts. According to Kelley, it became the ƧƬrst ‘happen-
ing.’ Responsible for the coining of the term, it came to mark the sub-
sequent development of a new class of performance.ሿቂ Happenings
are considered dependent upon their one-oƦf nature, excluding them
from the category of ‘performables,’ which are deƧƬned by their poten-
tial for repetition.ሿቃ This leaves happenings and dance works ontolog-
ically distinct. However, it is recent re-stagings of the work that are of
interest here. Re-performances of 18 Happenings have demonstrated
thework to be both performable and a dancework. Theworkwas ƧƬrst
re-staged in 2006 by dance theorist and curator Andre Lepecki, atMu-
nich’s Haus de Kunst. In 2010 UK choreographer Rosemary Butcher
also re-staged 18 Happenings at the Haywood Gallery in London. Sig-
niƧƬcantly, these re-stagings, and subsequent accounts of the process,
reveal the centrality of the score to the work as well as its ontological
instability.
During a discussion about the re-staging, Lepecki explains that
Kaprow created multiple scores, as well as over 400 pages of notes
ሿቀLepecki 2012.
ሿቁKelley 2012, p. 22.
ሿቂIbid., p. 22.
ሿቃMcFee 2011, p. 160.
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and instructions.ሿቄ Lepecki suggests that he was initially reluctant to
undertake the project due to the perceived singularity of happen-
ings; however, consulting Kaprow’s score encouraged him to take the
project on.ሿቅ The restaging of 18 Happenings has a number of poten-
tial outcomes for its status as a happening. Perhaps it suggests that,
despite the work’s name and its impact at the time of the ƧƬrst perfor-
mance, the work was in fact a performable all along, and therefore is
not a happening. It is plausible that the re-performance of the work
reveals a feature (i.e., its performability), that was previously unrecog-
nised.
An alternative outcomewould be to suggest that thework remains
a happening, but that happenings are in fact repeatable. This is con-
tentious, as it challenges the deƧƬning feature of this type of perfor-
mance. So what is the diƦference between 18 Happenings, and sub-
sequent, legitimate happenings? The answer to this question lies in
the score. Were it not for the existence of the score, and Lepeki’s sub-
sequent ability to access the work through this score, the re-staging
would not have occurred, and 18 Happenings would have remained
a happening, with the potential for re-performance greatly dimin-
ished. Lepecki claims that consulting the score demonstrated the per-
formable nature of the work, and revealed Kaprow’s intention for the
work to be repeatable. He outlines a crucial sentence in Kaprow’s
notes, where Kaprow suggests that, “Each of these parts may be ar-
ranged indeƧƬnitely.”ሿቆ This clearly conƧƬrms the work’s status as an on-
going, repeatable entity, reiterating both the fundamental role of the
score in the work’s ontology as well as the work’s performability.
Indeed Kaprow agreed for a restaging to take place in 2006.ቀሽ This
suggests that 18 Happeningswas always intended to be a performable,
a feature revealed through the re-staging, and enabled by the score.
Nevertheless, it was not always a dance work. Re-stagings of 18 Hap-
penings by dance professionals has re-situated the work. Distinctions
ሿቄLepecki 2012.
ሿቅIbid.
ሿቆMeyer-Hermann, Rosenthal, and Lepecki 2007, p. 45.
ቀሽLepecki 2012.
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between forms have become increasingly ƥƷuid, and it is accepted that
performance works in particular might belong to multiple categories.
The work of physical theatre company DV8 provides a well-known ex-
ample of this ƥƷuidity. Furthermore, conceptual choreographic prac-
tices, such as those of choreographer La Ribot, can be seen as belong-
ing equally to dance, performance art, and theatre. These ascriptions
to categories are not based on content or style, but rather on who cre-
ated the work, as well as where, when, and why the work was created.
To put it another way, the lack of deƧƬning features, whether percep-
tible or intrinsic, of performing art forms means that we increasingly
rely upon context to categorise or deƧƬne a work. This accounts for the
way inwhich the appropriation of 18 Happenings by dance profession-
als was enough to justify its status as a dance work.
Accepting 18 Happenings as a dance work implies that the re-
staging can tell us something about choreographic practice. Lepecki
points out that Kaprow had a ‘deep investment in scripts,’ and that
working on paper allowed him to ƧƬnd a way to organise movement.ቀሾ
This reiterates the textual nature of choreography; it also reiterates the
ontological importance of the score. Such is the importance of the
score of 18 Happenings that Lepecki makes a signiƧƬcant claim regard-
ing its role. Suggesting the work was created on paper, he claims that
the creationof theworkwasnot dependent uponembodiment, even if
the performative execution of this piece did exhibit this dependency.ቀሿ
This demonstrates how the act of choreography can occur without
the body, challenging Carr’s claim about its essentially embodied na-
ture. Whilst it seems safe to claim that dance scores are composed
in reference to the body, as is the case with Kaprow’s choreography
for 18 Happenings, the act of choreography sits apart from the act of
dancing. Choreography can (and does) take place without dancing.
This position does not represent all choreographic practices, some of
which are heavily dependent upon improvisation, for example, but it
demonstrates that choreography in itself does not necessarily require
a present, dancing body. This implication is that in cases where the
ቀሾLepecki 2012.
ቀሿIbid.
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work is created through writing a score, the work exists on the page
prior to instantiation, shifting dance ontology closer to theatre and
music and highlighting the ontological centrality of the score. As Carr
suggests in relation to theatre, we are able to access some of the fea-
tures of 18 Happenings through consulting the score; hence Lepecki’s
ability to re-stage the piece.
It is possible, however, that Kaprow’s score is not a score after all.
Lepecki refers to it as both score and script, anddraws a distinctionbe-
tween the score and other notes and instructions for the work.ቀቀ The
score does not take the form of a codiƧƬed notational system; it con-
sists of instructions, drawn ƧƬgures, often with arrows denoting move-
ment, and many written notes.ቀቁ The form certainly does not meet
Goodman’s strict requirements for being a notational system. Nei-
ther does it oƦfer a detailed account of the body, like Labanotation
might. But we might justify its status as a score simply by taking ref-
erences to the work in discourse, where it is considered to be a score,
seriously. Furthermore, although the language of the piece does not
meet Goodman’s requirements for a notational system, it does meet
McFee’s Thesis of Notationality: the form it is written in is accepted
and understood by dance practitioners. Furthermore, two separate
performances, each following the score, will both be instances of 18
Happenings, demonstrated by the re-staging of the work. The form
of the score is important: it diƦfers from usual Labanotation scores in
three key ways. First, it does not focus on the details of bodily move-
ment; second, itwas createdprior to thework; and third, itwas created
by the author of the work.
SigniƧƬcantly, these features aremade possible by the non-codiƧƬed
formof thenotation. It is unusual for choreographers to alsobeprofes-
sional notators, and as such authorship of the score is usually distinct
from authorship of the work. This could be a key reason for the use
of idiosyncratic forms of notation in dance. Scoring is used by chore-
ographers to make sense of ideas, and to plan works, as opposed to
being used to record the details of speciƧƬc movements. This allows
ቀቀIbid.
ቀቁMeyer-Hermann, Rosenthal, and Lepecki 2007, pp. 1-7.
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for choreography to occur on the page, for scores to exist prior to per-
formance, and therefore for features of works to be accessed through
the score.
3 Synchronous Objects
American choreographer William Forsythe is one of a growing num-
ber of artists turning their attention to the relationship between in-
scription, process, performance, and technology. In his essay ‘Chore-
ographic Objects,’ Forsythe distinguishes between choreography and
dance, asking, “is it possible for choreography to generate autonomous
expressions of its principles, a choreographic object, without the
body?”ቀቂ One of the ƧƬrst outcomes of Forsythe’s exploration of this
question was the website Synchronous Objects (SO), created in 2009
in collaboration with Maria Palazzi and Norah Zuniga Shaw. The
site aims to examine the choreographic structures and systems of his
dance work One Flat Thing, reproduced (OFTR) (2000).
This exploration focuses on a ƧƬlmed version of OFTR made in
2006. SO entails twenty ‘choreographic objects,’ comprising visuali-
sations, graphs, and diagrams, which demonstrate the structure and
operating systems of OFTR. The objects examine components such as
dynamics, counterpoint, cues, sound, architecture, and so on. One
example is the ‘Cue Score,’ which explains through graphs and dia-
grams the cueing system that triggers the performance activity. Other
tools include the ‘Alignment Annotator,’ which visualises the relation-
ship between the dancers through coloured shapes and lines, and the
‘Counterpoint Tool,’ which uses a pattern-generating algorithm to al-
low users to control performing ‘widgets,’ in order to experiment with
the possibilities of counterpoint.ቀቃ
Drawing a distinction between choreography and instances of em-
bodiment is not entirely new. It refers back to the traditional view of
dance works as abstract objects distinct from physical performances.
Although articulated diƦferently, Forsythe’s unfastening of dancing
ቀቂForsythe 2008.
ቀቃDocumentation of these tools can be found on the SO website: http://synchronousobjects.osu.edu
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and choreography can be seen to follow a similar line of reasoning as
the philosopherswe have examined,McFee andGoodman, who claim
that dance works are essentially abstract movement structures. How-
ever, it is important to acknowledge that SO demonstrates the nota-
tionality of structures other than movement.
Some of the tools on SO appear to adopt codiƧƬed notational lan-
guages, using symbols to denote components. However, the diagrams
donot describe themovement of body parts, as is the casewith Laban-
otation. Rather, the focus is on describing non-visual, relational fea-
tures, such as cueing, dynamics and counterpoint. Furthermore, SO
was not generated as a record or a recipe; it was developed to enhance
our understanding of the work, and to examine the complexities of
choreographic structure.ቀቄ How, then, does it relate to the concept of
a score, in either notational or non-notational form?
Unfortunately I donot have space here to analyse all of the tools on
SO against Goodman’s ƧƬve requirements for notation. SuƦƧƬce it to say
that some toolswould be closer tomeeting the requirements than oth-
ers, which are perhaps better explained through Goodman’s discus-
sions of diagrams and models.ቀቅ Importantly, however, SO does seem
to fulƧƬl the requirements of the Thesis of Notationality. Although not
intended to function as a recipe, interpreting the ‘text’ would arguably
result in a performance of OFTR. It is important to remember that
McFee requires only that the notation be “agreed by the knowledge-
able in the art form to be an adequate notation for that form.”ቀቆ It may
seem that SO does notmeet this condition; it uses languages from var-
ious disciplines, which need to be decoded through written explana-
tion. However, althoughMcFee’s thesis calls for a notational language
that is distinct from writing, surely any non-universal system would
need some further linguistic explanation or translation. As such, there
is no reason to suppose that these forms are not a legitimateway of no-
tating choreography, despite not notating the body.
Claiming that the dynamic archive of the website is a choreo-
ቀቄForsythe 2009.
ቀቅGoodman 1968, p. 170Ʀf.
ቀቆMcFee 1992, p. 97-98.
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graphic score decentralisesmovement as theprimary feature of chore-
ography, due to the fact that the speciƧƬc behaviour of individual body
parts is simply not notated. Were thewhole site to function as a recipe
for performance, in terms of movement dancers would simply have to
copy the recording. This would not meet the requirements of McFee’s
thesis, as a recording is not a notational language. An alternative ap-
proach would be to use only the notational forms as a recipe, which
would result in an alternative expression of the choreographic princi-
ples of the work, thus highlighting a key feature of the project by re-
sponding to the primary research question: “What elsemight physical
thinking look like?”ቁሽ
It is unclear how SO relates to OFTR. The website annotates a
recorded version of the work. SigniƧƬcantly, it is not a recording of a
live performance. McFee suggests that, as with scores, we cannot ac-
cess dance works through recordings,ቁሾ but we can question this in re-
lation to dance performances made especially for ƧƬlm, as is the case
here. The question of SO’s ontological status is mademore diƦƧƬcult by
the complex nature of dance on ƧƬlm.ቁሿ Philip Auslander and Noel Car-
roll both provide arguments for the performative ontology of ƧƬlm.ቁቀ
Like performances, ƧƬlms are enacted temporarily. Furthermore, it is
possible to see digital information as ontologically similar to tradi-
tional performances—for example SO is not permanently physically
present, rather it is enacted by the user. For example, the appearance
and performance of the ‘widget’ is dependent upon user-activation.
Leaving aside the metaphysics of source codes, it would be fair to say
that the site exists in tangible form only temporarily. When activated,
the performances and structures on the site unfold in relation to time.
Although we can stop and replay, these subsequent actions are simi-
larly played out in the passing of time. The point is that, like a dance
work, SO is abstract until made concrete, for a limited time; its physi-
cal manifestation is merely temporal, while the score performs.
ቁሽForsythe 2009.
ቁሾMcFee 1992, p. 88.
ቁሿSee Blades 2011.
ቁቀAuslander 1999; Carroll 2005.
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The parallel between performance and recording suƦfers from the
determined nature of recording. No matter how willing and able we
are to suspend our belief, the fact remains that the performance on
ƧƬlm has already been resolved. The dancers know how the perfor-
mance ended, even if we, as spectators, do not. But while the ƧƬlm of
OFTR possesses this determined nature, SO does not. The interactive
nature of some of the tools, such as the Counterpoint Tool, oƦfers po-
tentially inƧƬnite outcomes. The tool provides a framework through
which users can experiment with counterpoint, creating individual
choreographic expressions. This reƥƷects some of the features of a no-
tated score. One of the reasons that McFee privileges notation over
recordings, for recording and preserving dance, is that notation allows
the key ontological feature of variability to remain intact. A notated
score will inevitably involve interpretation, and allow for individual
expression. This feature is similarly present in the interactive tools of-
fered on SO. Like a score, the site operates within a constrained form
whilst allowing for potentially inƧƬnite outcomes.
Perhaps we have reached a conclusion that SO is an interactive,
performative score. However, the website is not primarily intended
to function as a tool for re-instancing OFTR. SO provides information
about OFTR; it enhances our understanding and appreciation of the
work. If this is correct, is it possible to claim that the site does not
provide access to the work? Here we are again faced with a problem
surrounding the nature of recording. We are able to gain knowledge
about a work through pausing, rewinding, and replaying ƧƬlms. But if
this is not experiencing thework, thenwhat does dance spectatorship
entail? While this question demonstrates the austere and potentially
problematic claim that we do not at all have access to OFTR through
SO, unfortunately I do not have space to go into the question here. But
this type of score provides uswithmuchmore than a solution towork-
identity questions; it enhances our knowledge both of thework and of
the complexities of choreographic structures.
55
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4 Conclusion
18 Happenings and Synchronous Objects oƦfer very diƦferent examples
of dance scores. Kaprow’s score demonstrates the way that choreog-
raphy can follow a similar model to theatre, using language and draw-
ing to instigate a performance. This challenges the traditional view
by suggesting that a score can provide access to speciƧƬc features of
the work; a claim that is demonstrated through Lepecki’s re-staging of
18 Happenings. It is possible to see that ontological revelations facili-
tated by the re-staging are dependent upon the score, and therefore to
attribute the score a central role in the nature of the work. SO, on the
other hand, has amore complex relationship to the work it illustrates,
and fulƧƬls the requirements of a score possibly accidentally. Neither
score follows a formal notationalmethod for dance, and both usewrit-
ten language to explain certain features.
Nonetheless, both examples fulƧƬl McFee’s Thesis of Notationality,
and furthermore demonstrate an expansion of this thesis. Scores are
not only created for preservation, nor are they simply useful for work-
identity; they also demonstrate choreography though forms other
than performance, revealing the multi-faceted nature of dance, and
its potential to exist in various ways. The way in which both examples
demonstrate the notationality of choreography, whilst avoiding notat-
ing details of speciƧƬc movements, decentralises the dancing body in
such works. This outcome suggests that dance works are more than
structures of movement. Rather, they consist of multiple conceptual,
relational, and organisational features that can described in linguistic,
performative, and visual notations, as well as in traditional forms.
bladesh@coventry.ac.uk
ؔؕآبا ا؛ؘ ؔبا؛آإ Hetty Blades is a PhD student in the Centre for Dance
Research at Coventry University. She originally trained as a dancer, graduating from
Laban in 2007, and completed an MA in Dance Studies at Roehampton University in
2010. Her research concerns the ontology of dance works in the digital sphere, and
the impact of technology on dance appreciation and understanding.
56
References
Auslander, Philip (1999). Liveness: Performance in aMediatized Culture. London: Rout-
ledge.
Birringer, Johannes (2013). “What Score? Pre-Choreography and Post-Choreography”.
In: International Journal of Performance Arts Digital Media 9.1, pp. 7–13.
Blades, Hetty (2011). “Dance on the Internet: An Ontological Investigation”. In: Post-
graduate Journal of Aesthetics 8.1, pp. 40–52.
Carr, David (1987). “Thought and Action in the Art of Dance”. In: British Journal of Aes-
thetics 27.4, pp. 345–357.
Carroll, Noël (2005). Philosophy of Art and Motion Pictures: An Anthology. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Forsythe, William (2008). Choreographic Objects. بإ؟: http : / /
synchronousobjects.osu.edu/media/inside.php?p=essay.
Forsythe, William (2009). Synchronous Objects for One Flat Thing, reproduced. بإ؟:
http://synchronousobjects.osu.edu/.
Goodman, Nelson (1968). Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols. New
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
Kelley, JeƦf (2012). “Alan Kaprow: Eighteen Happenings in Six Parts, 2004”. In: Dance:
Documents of Contemporary Art. Ed. by Andre Lepecki. London: Whitechapel
Gallery, pp. 33–35.
Laurenti, Jean-Noel (1994). “Feuillet’s Thinking”. In: Traces of dance : drawings and no-
tations of choreographers. Ed. by Laurence Louppe. Trans. by Brian Holmes. Paris:
Editions Dis Voir, pp. 81–108.
Lepecki, Andre (2012).Not as Before, but Again: Reenactments and ‘Transcreation’. بإ؟:
http://artsresearch.ucsc.edu/vps/reenactment.
McFee, Graham (1992). Understanding Dance. London: Routledge.
McFee,Graham(2011).ThePhilosophicalAesthetics ofDance: Identity, Performanceand
Understanding. Hampshire: Dance Books.
Meyer-Hermann, Eva, Stephanie Rosenthal, and André Lepecki (2007). Alan Kaprow:
18 Happenings in 6 Parts. Steidl Hauser &Wirth: Switzerland.
Siegel, Marcia B (1972). At the Vanishing Point. New York: Saturday Review Press.
postgraduate journal of aesthetics 57
